2 edition of The optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection found in the catalog.
Published
2004
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics in Cambridge, MA
.
Written in English
Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both unemployment insurance and employment protection - in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation. Keywords: Unemployment insurance, employment protection, unemployment benefits, layoff taxes, layoffs, severance payments. JEL Classifications: D60, E62, H21, J30, J32, J38, J65.
Edition Notes
| Statement | [by] Olivier Blanchard |
| Series | Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 04-15, Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 04-15. |
| Contributions | Tirole, Jean, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 44 p. ; |
| Number of Pages | 44 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL24640572M |
| OCLC/WorldCa | 55231797 |
Olivier Jean Blanchard, and Jean Tirole, “The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass”, Journal of the European . The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass In: NBER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] paper: The Quality of Labor Relations and Unemployment In: NBER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] paper: Inflexible Relative Prices and Price Level Inertia In: NBER Working Papers.
How does unemployment insurance work? If you’ve bought an unemployment insurance policy and you lose your job, you’ll be paid a tax-free monthly income that starts after you’ve been off work for a pre-agreed waiting period.. This is sometimes called the deferred longer this period is, the lower your premium – so it’s worth looking at a couple of options. employment. Optimal reforms of Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance yield meaningful welfare gains of worth, respectively, % and % of average life-time consumption. Third, we demonstrate that the nature of the family unit has important implications for the optimal design of social assistance programs. Relative to a population of.
Contours of employment protection reform with Jean Tirole November The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass. Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole April Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets, with Francesco Giavazzi October Abstract. Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity.
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The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass Olivier Blanchard, Jean Tirole. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in AprilRevised in November NBER Program(s):Economic Fluctuations and Growth, Monetary Economics Cited by: inSection2that,inthiscase,itisoptimalto partlycompensateforthelimitsoninsurancebydecreasingtheincidenceofun- employment.
An illustration of an open book. Books. An illustration of two cells of a film strip. Video. An illustration of an audio speaker. Audio An illustration of a " floppy disk. The optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection: a first pass Item Preview remove-circlePages: Downloadable.
Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be.
The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection.
A First Pass Olivier Blanchard and Jean Tirole NBER Working Paper No. AprilRevised November JEL No. D60, E62, H21, J30, J32, J38, J65 ABSTRACT Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, withCited by: The authors use a simple model to study the optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection.
Workers are risk averse and face the possibility of unemployment. Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation.
In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. The authors use a simple model to study the optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection.
Workers are risk averse and face the possibility of unemployment. Firms are risk neutral and face random shocks to productivity. Workers can participate in a shadow economy.
The joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection. A flrst pass.⁄ Olivier Blanchardy Jean Tirole z Septem Abstract Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk averse workers, risk.
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design.
We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation.
In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design. The optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection a first pass.
NBER Working Papers, vol. Boeri, T., Conde-Ruiz, I.J., Galasso, V., Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk-averse workers, risk-neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity.
We show that, in the "first best," unemployment. Wiemer Salverda, Daniele Checchi, in Handbook of Income Distribution, Unemployment Benefit. Even if unemployment benefits and employment protection are negatively correlated in the data (Bertola and Boeri, ), in principle they do respond to the same problem of reducing the intertemporal variability of workers’ earnings (Blanchard and Tirole, ).
This may explain why. The optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection: a first pass Author: Olivier Blanchard ; Jean Tirole ; National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass. [Jean Tirole; Olivier Blanchard; National Bureau of Economic Research;] -- Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on.
An illustration of an open book. Books. An illustration of two cells of a film strip. Video. An illustration of an audio speaker. Audio. An illustration of a " floppy disk. The joint design of unemployment insurance and employment protection: a first pass Item Preview remove-circle.
Unemployment Insurance Legislative Policy (Brown Book) Draft Legislation (Orange Book) Draft Language (Green Book) Interstate Agreements. With the advent of unemployment insurance legislation in this country, it became apparent that the State-Federal relationship envisioned would present some problems in implementation.
On the other hand, they are often financially or/and administratively constrained from installing unemployment insurance schemes. Since it is much harder and more expensive to design and implement unemployment insurance schemes than to do so with employment laws, the above constraints are expected to overshadow the preference for UB over EPL.
By providing unemployment insurance, the government reduces the opportunity cost of unemployment. This reduces search effort and increases both the length of unemployment spells and the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
In designing an optimal U1 program, the positive and negative effects of U1 must be weighed against one another. Thejointdesignofunemploymentinsuranceandemployment pass.* OlivierBlanchard^ JeanTirole* November11, Abstract Unemploymentinsurance.The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass.
By Olivier Jean Blanchard and Jean Tirole Get PDF ( KB).Partial insurance against wage and employment shocks is provided by social programs, savings and the labor supplies of all adult household members. The optimal policy mix focuses mainly on Social Assistance, which provides a permanent universal household income floor, with a minor role for temporary earnings-related Unemployment Insurance.
